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Abstract 
All that we know about the CEO labour market in China comes from studies of public listed 
companies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This paper is the first to examine the operation of the 
CEO labour market across all sectors of the Chinese economy. We do so using World Bank enterprise 
data for the first part of the 21st Century. Incentive schemes are commonplace throughout the 
economy and include contracts linking CEO pay directly to firm performance, annual bonus schemes, 
the posting of performance bonds, and holding company stock. These incentive mechanisms appear to 
complement rather than substitute for one another. The elasticity of pay with respect to company 
performance is one or more in two-fifths of the cases where CEO's have performance contracts, 
suggesting many face high-powered incentives. CEO's also face a real dismissal threat and financial 
penalties if they fail to deliver. Incentive contracts are used to attract the most talented executives, as 
indicated by educational attainment and position in the Communist Party. However, government 
involvement in the appointment of a CEO reduces the likelihood that the CEO will receive an 
incentives-based contract, perhaps because governments appoint “bureaucrats” to perform roles which 
incorporate social and political as well as economic goals. Firms with good corporate governance are 
more likely to deploy incentive contracts. A picture emerges of a well-functioning labour market for 
executives in China that exhibits many of the traits common to CEO labour markets in the West.   
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1. Introduction 
 
A market for corporate executives started to emerge in China in the 1980s as a result of 
government initiatives to reform State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).  Prompted by career 
incentives to enhance the productivity and performance of SOEs, local government officials 
opened up competition for CEO posts in SOEs through auctions for managerial contracts 
(Xu, 2011).  These contracts offered CEO’s greater autonomy in corporate decision-making 
and replaced direct control from above with managerial incentives (Groves, 1995: 874). The 
market for corporate executives received a further fillip with the programme of privatisation 
which followed in the 1980s and, by the late 1990s, the emergence of a public listed sector. 
While the early literature on CEO’s in China was confined to SOEs, the recent literature is 
dominated by studies examining executive pay in the listed company sector (Bryson et al., 
2012a; Conyon and He, 2012). However, the vast majority of all firms in China are not listed 
and they only account for a small proportion of all workers.  At the time our data were 
collected in 2005, roughly 418.6 million workers worked in non-agriculture firms, whereas 
only 5-6 million workers worked in listed firms.
1
 So the picture listed firms paint of the 
executive labour market is incomplete and does not reflect the labour market circumstances 
and compensation arrangements that obtain in most firms in China and for most CEO's.   
We fill this gap in the literature by examining the executive labour market and CEO 
compensation across the whole industrial sector in China.  We do so with World Bank 
Enterprise Data from surveys conducted in 2003 and 2005
2
, two decades after the initial 
market-inspired reforms and a phenomenal period of economic growth. We consider whether 
CEO selection in China is a meritocratic or largely bureaucratic exercise, describing how 
China's CEO's are appointed, who makes the decisions, who the CEO's are and where they 
come from. Then we examine how CEO's are paid, focusing primarily on the incidence and 
correlates of various aspects of CEO incentives.  We find incentive schemes are 
commonplace and include contracts linking CEO pay directly to firm performance, annual 
bonus schemes, the posting of performance bonds, and holding company stock. These 
incentive mechanisms appear to complement rather than substitute for one another. The 
elasticity of pay with respect to company performance is one or more in two-fifths of the 
cases where CEO's have performance contracts, suggesting many face high-powered 
incentives.  CEO's also face a real dismissal threat and financial penalties if they fail to 
deliver.  In keeping with the Western literature, incentive contracts attract better workers, as 
indicated by education and one's position in the Communist Party.  Foreign owned firms are 
less likely than state-owned and domestic privately owned firms to use incentive contracts. 
However, where government is involved in the CEO's appointment in a domestic firm, the 
CEO is less likely to have pay linked to firm performance. Good corporate governance and 
incentive contracts are positively correlated, suggesting complementarity. A picture emerges 
of a well-functioning labour market for executives in China that exhibits many of the traits 
common to CEO labour markets in the West.   
 
 
2. Who are China's CEO's and how are they appointed? 
 
The standard principal-agent problem described in the CEO compensation literature assumes 
CEO's are recruited to maximise shareholder value by raising the profitability of the firm but 
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 Estimates for the non-listed sector are based on China's Statistical Yearbook. Those for the listed sector are 
the authors' estimates based on CSMAR financial accounts data. 
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that, in the absence of perfect monitoring, CEO's may invest time in improving their own 
future career prospects, perhaps to the detriment of the firm (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). 
Shareholders therefore use incentive mechanisms and the threat of dismissal to hold CEO's 
accountable.
3
  
The existing empirical evidence on the use of incentive mechanisms is focuses on the US 
and other Western economies (see, for example, Conyon et al, 2012). The Chinese setting is 
different in two fundamental ways. First, ownership is more concentrated than in the West: in 
two-thirds (68%) of our 2005 survey the firm had a single owner.  This increases both the 
incentive and, arguably, the ability of the owner to monitor top executives' behaviour and 
performance relative to the scenario in which the CEO is accountable to multiple owners.  
Second, the state and economic activity are inextricably linked in China. The state owns 
a substantial part of the corporate sector in China. Despite divesting itself of many previously 
state owned enterprises and reducing its stake in publicly listed firms,  the state continued to 
have a majority stake in over two-fifths (45%) of publicly listed firms in 2010, and these 
accounted for three-quarters (73%) of the employment in the sector and four-fifths (82%) of 
its output (Bryson et al., 2012a).   
State ownership is less common in the economy as a whole.  According to the World 
Bank 2003 Survey, the mean state ownership stake in enterprises was 22%, ranging from 
63% in the one-third of organizations which were SOE's, a 20% stake in public listed firms, 
one-sixth state ownership in cooperatives, and near-zero involvement in privately held firms. 
Twenty-one percent of corporations were majority state-owned, 12% were majority 
foreign-owned, and the remainder were majority domestically-owned. The picture that 
emerges is a far more mixed economy than the one portrayed in the literatures which focus on 
SOE's and the public listed sector. 
It would be surprising if the state did not play a central role in the appointment and 
dismissal of CEO's in firms that are government-owned. In 2003 the state had direct influence 
over who was appointed to the CEO position in a quarter of all firms, directly appointing 
them in 12% of cases and rubber-stamping the firm's nominee in another 13% (Table 1). The 
role of the state was most prominent in firms that were majority state-owned, of course, with 
government directly appointing over one-third of CEO's and rubber-stamping firm nominees 
in another one-quarter of cases. In domestic and foreign firms, it was the Board of Directors 
that usually made appointments.  But state involvement was not unheard of in these firms. 
A similar picture emerges from the 2005 survey. This survey only asks whether the CEO was 
appointed by the government or not. It shows that CEO's were state appointments in around 
one-tenth (12%) of all firms, ranging from 48% in SOE's to only 2% in foreign-owned firms. 
It is apparent, therefore, that focusing only on SOE's risks understating the breadth of 
influence the state had over CEO appointments in China in the early 2000s. 
The role of the state extends well beyond its direct role in CEO appointments.   Cao et 
al. (2012) show that the political system offers strong career incentives to CEO's which 
sometimes compensate for monetary incentives.  This does not necessarily mean that 
politically motivated CEO's operate as "bureaucrats" because political preferment often 
depends on CEO's demonstrating business success (Xu, 2011).We are able to glimpse the role 
that political advancement might play in the CEO labour market in China in Table 2 which 
shows the Communist Party membership of CEO's in 2003. Two-thirds of all CEO's were 
Party members.  The figure varies markedly by ownership status: over nine-in-ten CEO's of 
SOE's are Party members, compared to two-thirds of those in private domestic firms and only 
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one-quarter of those in the foreign-owned sector.
4
  Furthermore, many CEO's hold senior 
positions in the Party, with around one-quarter holding the post of Party Secretary.  
The 2003 survey indicates that over half (54%) of CEO's had no experience of being a 
senior executive before they entered their current position. Those with prior experience had a 
mean of three years as a CEO elsewhere. Despite the State’s role in appointments, few CEO's 
come directly from political positions, however.  The 2003 survey asked respondents: 
"Before becoming CEO in this firm what was his/her position?"  Only 6% of CEO's had 
been government officials.
5
  One-fifth (22%) had been CEO's elsewhere. Over a third had 
direct firm-specific human capital: one-quarter (27%) had been promoted from the position of 
Deputy to the CEO, and 8% had held other positions within the firm.  The remaining 37% 
coded the "Other" response.  CEO's general levels of human capital are impressive: 
two-thirds (68%) were graduates and a further 15% were post-graduates. 
We have shown that the corporate sector is more heterogeneous than the picture 
emerging from studies which focus solely on SOEs or public listed firms but that the 
importance of government in the operation of the labour market extends well beyond the 
SOEs. 
 
 
3. Are China's CEO's free to manage and how are they held accountable? 
 
If China's CEO's were simply bureaucrats, paid to perform tasks required by the state, one 
might expect their behaviours to be governed by procedures laid down by the state, in which 
case they would have little of the operational autonomy which one normally associates with 
the position of CEO.  Both the 2003 and 2005 surveys ask what degree of autonomy CEO's 
have over decisions relating to production, investment and employment. The 2005 survey 
question is preferred here as it explicitly states that autonomy refers to non-intervention by 
government.  As Table 3 indicates, CEO's have a high degree of autonomy over operational 
decision-making, which means that firms' owners will be concerned to align CEO's interests 
with those of the firm, whether it be through political preferment, financial incentives, or via 
the threat of dismissal.  Six-in-ten (61%) CEO's score the maximum autonomy score.
6
  
However, there is quite a lot of heterogeneity across firms both within and across 
ownership-type.  CEO's in SOE's tend to have lower autonomy than those in other firms, 
with those in the private domestic sector having significantly more autonomy than others.
7
 
The corporate governance literature emphasises the importance of the Board of Directors 
and its composition in ensuring that firms are run in a transparent way and that executives are 
held to account.  Safeguards against CEO malfeasance include the presence of independent 
executives on the Board who are able to hold executives to account, and the separation of the 
CEO and Chair of the Board roles to avoid CEO's having undue influence over corporate 
decision-making.  Corporate governance practices in the Chinese public listed sector are 
well-documented. They show, for example, that firms immediately conformed with the state 
regulator's requirement that one-third of Board members should be independents when it 
came into effect in 2003 and that by 2010 Compensation Committees were almost universally 
adopted by firms to set executive compensation (Bryson et al., 2012a).  
                                                 
4
 The low incidence of Party membership among CEOs of firms that are majority foreign-owned is partially 
explained by the prevalence of foreign CEOs in such firms. Around three-fifths (57%) of their CEOs are 
Chinese and, among this group, 44% are Party members. 
5
 The figure was 8% in SOEs, compared with 6% in private domestic firms and 1% in foreign-owned firms. 
6
 They tend to have more autonomy over production and employment than they do over investment decisions 
(figures not shown). 
7
 We get similar results using the 2003 survey. 
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The situation is rather different in the economy as a whole. In 2005 fewer than 
three-quarters (72%) of firms had a Board of Directors.  They were particularly uncommon 
in collectively-owned firms (41%) and SOE's (50%).  Where there was a Board of Directors, 
the CEO also Chaired the Board in half (50%) of all cases.  This practice was twice as 
common in private domestically owned firms as it was in SOE's (67% compared to 34%).
8
  
These figures compare unfavourably to the public listed sector where only around 12% of 
firms had CEO's who were also the Board Chair in 2005 (Bryson et al., 2012a: 27). The 
prevalence of independent directors is also lower once one steps outside of the public listed 
sector. On average across the economy, only 12% of all Board members were independents, 
with most firms (68%) having no independent members on their Board.  
The low incidence of Boards of Directors, the scarcity of independent members and the 
relatively high incidence of CEO "duality" raise questions about firms' ability to hold their 
CEO's to account.  Holding them to account requires a credible threat, such as the ability to 
dismiss the CEO. Respondents to the 2005 survey were asked "Has the company fired or 
demoted any CEO or Vice CEO in the past four years?"  One-fifth (22%) of firms had done 
so.  This is equivalent to a 5 percent chance of being fired or demoted in a given year, a 
figure which seems non-ignorable but low nonetheless.
9
  However, the firms with a Board 
of Directors carry a bigger threat effect: 25% of firms with a Board of Directors had fired or 
demoted a CEO or Vice CEO, compared to only 14% of those firms without a Board of 
Directors.
10
 
The low incidence of dismissals partly explains the length of CEO tenure.  Mean tenure 
of current CEO's was a little under 6.5 years in the 2005 survey.  In 22% of firms the CEO 
had been in post for over 10 years.  Thus CEO's throughout the Chinese economy tend to 
remain in post longer than CEO's in the public listed sector (Bryson et al., 2012a) and longer 
than other employees.
11
 
It seems that China’s CEOs have substantial autonomy in corporate decision-making but 
corporate governance structures remain fairly weak and few CEOs face a credible dismissal 
threat if they perform poorly. 
 
 
4. Is CEO compensation linked to firm performance and if so, how? 
 
The suspicion that the state appoints "bureaucrats" to CEO positions, together with a common 
assumption that political advancement is the preferred career path for many CEO's in China, 
suggests firms may be less likely to resort to incentive pay to resolve principal-agent 
problems than might be the case in the West.  On the other hand, the state has a strong track 
record in experimenting with incentive structures in SOE's (Xu, 2011; Bryson et al., 2012a, 
2012b) and, more recently, in paving the way for the use of stock options and other incentive 
mechanisms in the publicly listed sector (Bryson et al., 2012a). By the early 2000s, CEO cash 
compensation in the publicly listed sector was highly sensitive to firm performance and 
towards the end of the decade firms had begun to adopt stock options (Bryson et al., 2012a; 
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 The 2003 survey paints a similar picture. Only half the firms (50%) had a Board of Directors and, where they 
did, CEO's also held the Chair of the Board position in almost half (48%) of cases. 
9
 The turnover rate in the listed sector is much higher: Bryson et al. (2012a) find that the turnover rate is 0.27 in 
2001 and drops to 0.15 ten years later. The 2003 survey asked "Have any executives of the firm been fired due 
to decisions of the board of directors?"  One-third (34%) said yes, but the figure is difficult to interpret since it 
does not refer to a timeframe. 
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 We also control for past firm performance and divide firms into quartiles based on their profit shares and we 
find that in each quartile, firms with a Board of Directors carry bigger threat effects.  
11
 Surveys from the Chinese integrated human resource services provider 51job Inc. estimate average annual 
labour turnover at 19.7% over the period 2007 to 2011. 
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Conyon and He, 2012). But how do these developments relate to the use of incentives 
elsewhere in the Chinese economy? 
The 2005 survey indicates that two-thirds (67%) of firms linked their CEO's annual 
income directly to the company's performance (Table 5). What's more, in one-quarter (23%) 
of firms these were "high powered" incentives in the sense that more than 10% of the CEO's 
annual income depended on whether or not the company's performance hit the agreed target. 
These contracts were common across all ownership types, though they were less common in 
foreign-owned firms than elsewhere.  
Performance-based contracts widened the distribution of cash compensation within the 
firm.  In the absence of incentive contracts, around half (52%) of CEOs had an annual 
income at least twice that of mid-level managers.
12
 This figure rose to 61% where CEO's 
were on low powered incentive contracts and to 80% when they were on high powered 
incentive contracts.  
The 2003 survey contains more detail on the means by which firms can link CEO 
compensation to firm performance (Table 6). It distinguishes between being on an incentive 
plan which links CEO income to performance (what we term an incentive contract); receipt 
of a wage paid annually which, under the Chinese system, is a method of paying annual 
bonuses; and the payment of an upfront bond by the CEO which is recovered if the CEO 
meets the performance targets set under the contract.  One-quarter (28%) of CEO's in the 
survey were on incentive contracts.  In most cases annual income was linked to performance 
measured in terms of both profits and sales.  One-fifth (19%) of CEO's were on annual pay 
contracts, and 10% paid a performance bond. Taken together, two-fifths (42%) of CEO's had 
their pay subject to performance based on at least one of these mechanisms and 15% were 
subject to more than one of these links between income and performance. These figures are 
lower than the incentive contract incidence in the 2005 survey, due in part to differences 
between the two samples and the survey questions
13
, but the 2003 survey confirms that the 
incidence of incentive-based contracts for CEO's was lowest in foreign owned firms. 
In keeping with the findings from the 2005 survey, these incentives were often high 
powered.  The median elasticity of pay with respect to company performance was 1.
14
 The 
performance bonds paid by CEO's often constituted a sizeable proportion of their total annual 
income (Bryson et al., 2012b).   
The 2003 survey also asked whether CEO's held company stock, another potentially 
important way in which CEO's performance can affect their wealth.  Almost a third (30%) 
of CEO's held stock.  In 13% of domestically owned private firms the CEO actually held a 
majority stake in the firm as owner-manager. 
The four incentive mechanisms identified in the 2003 survey are positively and 
significantly correlated, suggesting that they may complement one another, rather than 
operate as substitutes.
15
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 Respondents were asked "How many times more is the CEO's annual income than that of mid-level 
managers?" with a note explaining "annual income includes salary and bonus". 
13
 For example, average firm size is lower in the 2003 survey. 
14
 Respondents were asked how much the CEO's income would increase if the performance measure increased 
by 1%. They were asked this for the first and second most important measures of performance used to make the 
decision. They were also asked the same question in relation to decreases in performance. Thus there are four 
questions asked. In each case the median elasticity of pay to performance was 1.0. 
15
 The correlation coefficients for a CEO incentive contract and other incentive mechanisms are all statistically 
significant at a 99% confidence level and are: annual pay contract (bonuses) 0.29; performance bond 0.16; holds 
company stock 0.09. The correlation coefficients for annual pay contract and a performance bond is 0.05 and its 
correlation with performance bonds is 0.09.  Again, both coefficients are statistically significant at a 99% 
confidence level.  The only correlation that is not statistically significant is that between a performance bond 
and stock holding (0.003, p 0.87).  
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Although one cannot directly compare the incidence of incentive pay contracts in the 
2003 and 2005 surveys, this section clearly demonstrates that incentive payments are 
widespread among CEO’s in China, that that they take a variety of forms but appear 
complementary to one another, and that the link between pay and performance is quite 
substantial. 
 
 
5. Influences on CEO compensation  
 
The overall impression from the two surveys is that incentive contracts were widely used to 
link CEO income to company performance in the early 2000s and that, in many instances, 
these were high powered incentives which placed a sizeable percentage of CEO income at 
stake.  However, there is quite a bit of variance in their usage, as is clear from the 
cross-tabulations with ownership. In this section we use multivariate models to account for 
the variation in the use of incentive contracts across firms. We anticipate the use of incentive 
contracts to reward CEO's will vary with other firm characteristics (size, industry etc., 
location), the firm's corporate governance arrangements, other policies used by the firm such 
as the threat of dismissal, and the characteristics of the CEO. 
Models therefore take the following form: 
 
1) fifziyfxif XIndCGComp    
 
where Compif is a dummy identifying contracts linking pay to performance for CEO i in firm 
f; CGf is a vector of corporate governance variables in firm f; Indi are individual CEO 
demographic and job attributes; and Xf are structural firm attributes; epsilon is the error term 
and the betas are coefficients to be estimated. In practice, the absence of panel data means 
that we observe only one CEO per firm and so the i and f are non-separable.  
We test for the joint significance of each block of variables, as well as discussing the 
significance of individual variables.  
Because the sampling and populations are very different we run separate models for the 
2005 and 2003 data sets.  We present linear estimates with standard errors clustered to 
account for city-level sampling.  There are two variants of the model specification for the 
2003 data. The first mimics the specification for the 2005 analysis.  The second extends the 
model to accommodate some variables that are only available in 2003, such as Communist 
Party membership.  Furthermore, we use the richer data on the nature of incentives in the 
2003 data to run the models on three variants of the incentive contract, namely: a simple 
dummy identifying whether the CEO has a contract linking pay to firm performance; a 
dummy variable identifying any of the three incentive forms of contract (a link to 
performance; an annual bonus; and a performance bond); and finally a count of up to three 
identifying the number of types of incentive mechanism to which the CEO is subject. Table 7 
presents the factors associated with CEO incentive contracts in 2005. Table 8 then presents 
six models using the 2003 survey data. Columns 1, 3 and 5 are model specifications similar to 
those for 2005 but for each of the three alternative incentive contract measures in turn (paid 
via a contract linking pay to performance, any of the three types identified, and the count of 
the three types of incentive contract). Columns 2, 4 and 6 run the same models but include 
additional controls that are only available in the 2003 data. The models explain between 9 
and 13 per cent of the variance in incentive contracts, depending on the model specification 
and dependent variable. 
First we discuss associations with CEO characteristics, then firm characteristics, and 
finally corporate governance effects. 
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CEO characteristics 
Incentive contracts are often used to attract the best managers to a firm since they can expect 
to earn more where their pay is a function of their higher productivity (Lazear, 2000).  This 
appears to be the case in China in 2005.  The strongest evidence that incentive contracts 
attract the most talented executives is contained in the educational attainment of CEO’s: 
those employed on incentive contracts were much more highly educated than those who were 
not. The finding is apparent in both the 2005 and 2003 surveys.  Achievement of high status 
in the Communist Party is often viewed as a marker of ability (Li et al., 2007) so that the 
positive and significant correlation between being a Party Secretary or Deputy Party 
Secretary (denoted by "high rank in the CP") and being paid for performance is consistent 
with the idea that firms use incentive contracts to attract the most talented employees to the 
position of CEO.  However, we can not discount the possibility that status in the Communist 
Party simply proxies the quality of individuals' political connections which gives them access 
to the best education and jobs. 
Indirect evidence regarding the link between incentive contracts and CEO talent comes 
in the form of the negative association between payment-for-performance and the 
appointment of the CEO by government.  Again, this is a robust finding across both data 
sets, and suggests that government may have a direct interest in appointing more 
“bureaucratic” CEO’s capable of achieving political and social objectives, rather than CEO’s 
intent on maximising firm performance. 
As noted earlier, one-third of CEO’s in the 2003 survey were appointed from within the 
firm either from the Deputy’s position or below. Internal appointments are associated with a 
higher probability of using an incentives-based contract, perhaps because this induces the 
most talented internal candidates to step forward into the post in much the same way as a 
tournament prize might operate. Incentive contracts may also be used to retain talented 
CEO’s.  The positive correlation between CEO tenure and the use of incentive contracts in 
the 2005 survey is consistent with this proposition. 
From a principal-agent perspective it only makes sense to incentivise CEO’s via a 
pay-for-performance contract if the CEO has sufficient autonomy to make meaningful 
operational decisions affecting the firm’s fortunes.  Both surveys distinguish between 
CEO’s autonomy over decision-making in three domains: production, employment and 
investment. In the 2005 survey the likelihood of employing a CEO on an incentive contract 
rises with autonomy over production matters, but falls where the CEO has greater autonomy 
over investment decisions, while autonomy over employment-related matters (hiring, firing 
and wages) is not significantly associated with incentive contracts. In 2003, the use of 
incentive contracts is positively associated with autonomy in employment decision-making, 
whereas autonomy in production is not significant.  But, as in the 2005 survey, the 2003 
survey reveals a negative association between investment autonomy and the use of incentive 
contracts. This negative association between incentive contracts and investment autonomy 
makes a great deal of sense since principals may be concerned that a CEO’s judgement 
regarding the appropriateness of an investment decision may be clouded by any direct 
personal interest in the impact of that decision.  For example, CEO’s may choose to forego 
investment opportunities in the short-run, even if they are in the best interests of the firm, if 
making the investment negatively affects the short-term company performance metrics used 
in an incentive contract to reward CEO’s. 
Another way to tie CEO fortunes to those of the firm is to offer them company stock.  
Analyses for 2003 indicate that those CEO’s with a minority share in the firm (holding below 
50% of the stock) are significantly more likely to be employed on incentive contracts than 
CEO’s with no company stock.  In this case stockholding complements other incentives.  
But CEO’s who are majority shareholders are no more likely than those holding no stock to 
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be employed on an incentive contract, perhaps because they become the principals, rather 
than the agents, when they are the majority shareholder. 
 
Firm characteristics 
The 2005 models contain five firm characteristics: ownership, industry, size, age, and two 
proxies for exogenous shocks to the firm, namely variance in sales over previous years and 
the number of power outages that have occurred in the previous three years. The 2003 models 
contain similar variables but does not contain information on power outages.  
The lower incidence of incentive contracts in foreign-owned workplaces, noted earlier in 
the univariate analyses, is also apparent here. Relative to those firms with majority state 
ownership, majority foreign owned firms are around 26 percentage points less likely to use 
incentive contracts. Differences across other ownership types are not statistically significant.  
This result holds when replacing majority ownership variables with any ownership, with the 
percentage owned by each owner type, or by the registered ownership status of the firm.
16
 
The negative significant association with foreign ownership is also apparent in the 2003 data 
regardless of model specification and across the three incentive contract measures. There is 
also substantial variance across industries: the industry dummies are jointly significant in 
both 2005 and 2003.   
Rosen (1990: 3) argued that the market will allocate the most talented CEO's to the 
largest firms “where the marginal productivity of their actions is greatly magnified over the 
many people below them to whom they are linked”.  It is not surprising, therefore, that 
incentive contracts are more prevalent in larger firms in both the 2005 and 2003 data sets. 
Having conditioned on firm size, there are no clear predictions as to the relationship 
between incentive contracts and firm age.  There is no significant relationship in the 2005 
data, but there is some evidence that older firms are less likely to use incentive contracts in 
the 2003 survey, albeit for only one of the three measures of incentive pay (Models 1 and 2 in 
Table 8).  
Where firm performance varies with market conditions or exogenous shocks which are 
beyond the CEO’s control, it is in the interests of the CEO and the firm to limit the extent to 
which executive pay is linked to firm performance (Rosen, 1990). In the 2005 data we proxy 
the unpredictability of the environment with the coefficient of variation in sales over the 
previous three years and the average annual number of power outages suffered by the firm in 
the last three years. Although both are negatively signed they are not statistically significant.  
Similarly the coefficient of variation in sales was not significant in the 2003 data.
17
 
Conversely, if market competition makes firm performance more responsive to CEO effort 
(because the firm will fail if the CEO shirks), we might anticipate a positive relationship 
between the degree of competition faced by the firm and incentive contracts.  In fact, when 
we entered a dummy variable capturing those firms with strong domestic competition the 
coefficient was negative and statistically significant. 
 
Corporate governance 
Where corporate governance is weak CEO’s have an opportunity to “capture” executive pay 
setting and thus “skim” profits from the firm (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2001). It may also be in their interests to limit the extent to which their pay 
varies with company performance.   Firms’ shareholders are likely to be more effective in 
holding CEO’s to account where they have a Board of Directors, where the Chair of the 
Board is a separate position from the CEO; where the Board’s ability to dismiss executives 
                                                 
16
 The alternative models are available from the authors on request. 
17
 The coefficient of variation in sales was omitted from the 2003 models presented here because its 
introduction reduced the estimation sample by 71 cases. The model is available from the authors on request. 
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for poor performance is credible; and where the Board includes members who are likely to be 
beyond the direct influence of the CEO, such as independent board members and employee 
representatives. 
Firms with a Board of Directors are more likely to offer incentive contracts than firms 
without a Board of Directors, as one might expect if they were effective in holding CEO’s to 
account.  Whether the CEO holds the position of Chair of the Board or not makes no 
significant difference concerning the use of incentive contracts. These results are apparent in 
both the 2005 and 2003 analyses.  However, the 2003 survey contains additional 
information on Board composition which confirms, as anticipated, that incentive contracts are 
more likely to be used where there are independent Board members and employee 
representatives on the Board. Indeed, accounting for the presence of independents and 
employee representatives results in the Board of Director variables becoming statistically 
non-significant (Table 8, Models 5 to 6). 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This paper is the first to examine the operation of the CEO labour market across all industrial 
sectors of the Chinese economy. We do so using World Bank enterprise data for the first part 
of the 21st Century. Incentive schemes are commonplace and include contracts linking CEO 
pay directly to firm performance, annual bonus schemes, the posting of performance bonds, 
and holding company stock. These incentive mechanisms appear to complement rather than 
substitute for one another. The elasticity of pay with respect to company performance is one 
or more in two-fifths of the cases where CEO's have performance contracts, suggesting many 
face high-powered incentives.  CEO's also face a real dismissal threat and financial penalties 
if they fail to deliver.   
Incentive contracts are used to attract talented executives. We find incentive contracts 
attract better educated executives and those with a higher position in the Communist Party, 
which is often treated as a strong indicator of ability. However, government involvement in 
the appointment of a CEO reduces the likelihood that the CEO will receive an 
incentives-based contract, perhaps because governments appoint “bureaucrats” to perform 
roles which incorporate social and political as well as economic goals. Those CEO’s on 
incentive contracts also have longer tenure, suggesting that they are successful in retaining 
talented executives. 
Firms with good corporate governance are more likely to deploy incentive contracts, 
confirming that incentive contracts are part of the array of “tools” firms use to hold CEO’s 
accountable. A picture emerges of a well-functioning labour market for executives in China 
that exhibits many of the traits common to CEO labour markets in the West.   
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Table 1: Who Appoints the CEO's? 
 Majority Owner: 
 Domestic Foreign State No 
majority 
All 
Firm nominates, govt 
approves 
11 4 24 9 13 
Government appointment 6 2 37 12 12 
Board of Directors appoints 40 74 15 67 38 
Decided at shareholders' 
meeting 
13 5 1 3 10 
Appointed at employees' 
meeting 
1 0 2 0 1 
Other 28 15 21 9 25 
Unweighted N 1,661 169 503 33 2366 
 
Note: authors' calculations from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 2003. Figures 
are column percentages.  
 
 
Table 2: Communist Party Position of CEO's 
 Majority Owner: 
 Domestic Foreign State No 
Majority 
All 
Party Secretary 20 9 34 45 23 
Deputy Party Secretary 5 1 16 0 7 
Committee or Executive 
Member 
11 3 23 6 13 
Ordinary member 28 12 19 16 25 
Not a member 37 74 8 32 33 
Unweighted N 1651 163 505 31 2350 
 
Note: authors' calculations from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 2003. Figures 
are column percentages. 
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Table 3: Job autonomy Among CEO's In China, 2005 
 Majority ownership status: Low Medium High 
State 34 28 38 
Collective 21 23 56 
Corporation 19 23 58 
Private 11 17 72 
Foreign 18 21 61 
No majority owner 20 25 56 
 
Note: authors' calculations from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 2005. 
Respondents asked to score their autonomy using an 8-item scale where 0=1-19% autonomy 
and 7=100% autonomy. Our scale sums scores on the three issues covered, namely 
production, investment, employment. Low scores are 0-16; medium scores are 17-20; high 
score is the maximum 21. Figures are row percentages. N=12,265 
 
 
Table 4: Incidence of Board of Directors and CEO Duality, 2005 
 Majority ownership status: Board of Directors CEO 'duality' 
State 50 34 
Collective 41 59 
Corporation 79 46 
Private 74 67 
Foreign 89 28 
No majority owner 88 37 
All 72 50 
 
Note: authors' calculations from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 2005. Figures 
are cell percentages. CEO 'duality' identifies those firms where the CEO is also Chair of the 
Board of Directors. Unweighted N for Board of Directors is 12,358.  Unweighted N for 
CEO 'duality' is those with a Board of Directors, namely 8,877. 
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Table 5: Performance Pay Among CEO's In China, 2005 
 Majority ownership status: Any 
Low 
Powere
d 
High 
Powered 
State 71 47 23 
Collective 64 47 17 
Corporation 73 47 25 
Private 67 43 23 
Foreign 50 31 17 
No majority owner 71 44 26 
All 67 44 23 
 
Note: authors' calculations from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 2005. Figures 
are cell percentages. Respondents asked "Is the CEO's annual income directly related to the 
company's performance?" Unweighted N=12,242. Follow up questions ask how CEO's 
income increases/decreases if company performance exceeds/fails the target with 7 
categorical responses recording the percentage change running from 1-5% to >61%.  "Low 
powered" identifies incentive contracts with <11% income at stake. "High powered" 
identifies incentive contracts with 11% or more income at stake.  Columns 2 and 3 based on 
unweighted N=11,938. 
 
 
Table 6: Types of CEO Performance Pay 
 Majority Owner: 
 Domestic Foreign State No 
majority 
All 
Incentive plan linking income to 
firm performance 
28 20 20 18 28 
Annual pay contract (Nian Xin Zhi) 20 26 16 18 19 
Performance Bond 11 3 17 9 11 
Any of 3 above 42 39 42 39 42 
More than 1 of 3 above 15 9 16 6 15 
Holds company stock 37 23 8 6 30 
Unweighted N 1676 171 519 33 2399 
 
Note: authors' calculations from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 2003. Figures 
are cell percentages. For row 1 question: "Does the CEO have any incentive plans linking 
his/her income to firm performance?" Row 2 question: "Is the CEO's wage paid annually 
(Nian Xin Zhi)?" Row 3 question: "Did the CEO post a security deposit?" Row 6 question: 
"Does the CEO own company stocks?" 
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Table 7: OLS of the Probability that a CEO’s Pay is Linked to Performance, 2005 
Dependent variable: Whether CEO Pay is Linked to Firm Performance 
[1] 
 
Coeff. 
 
CEO characteristics:   
CEO tenure 0.002 ** 
 [2.50]  
Education of CEO 0.044 *** 
 [7.92]  
CEO appointed by government -0.064 *** 
 [-3.98]  
Production autonomy of CEO 0.014 *** 
 [3.18]  
Investment autonomy of CEO -0.016 *** 
 [-5.70]  
Employment autonomy of CEO -0.003  
 [-0.58]  
Firm characteristics:   
Majority ownership: State ref.  
Collective -0.003  
 [-0.13]  
Legal persons 0.015  
 [0.92]  
  Private -0.016  
           [-0.99]  
  Foreign -0.203 *** 
           [-8.58]  
  No majority ownership -0.021  
           [-0.74]  
Size (Log of employees) 0.028 *** 
           [7.72]  
Age (Log of years) -0.006  
           [-0.84]  
Coefficient of variation in sales, last 3 years -0.016  
           [-0.84]  
Number of power outages annually -0. 010  
 [-0.49]  
    Continued 
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Table 7 continued 
Dependent variable: Whether CEO Pay is Linked to Firm Performance 
[1]  
Coeff.  
Corporate governance:   
Type of Board of Directors (BOD): None ref.  
BOD with CEO/Chair separation 0.044 *** 
 
[2.96] 
 
BOD with CEO/Chair duality 0.035 *** 
 
[2.71] 
 
CEO fired or demoted in last 4 years 0.057 *** 
 
[5.52] 
 
Constant   0.412 *** 
           [7.00]  
Adjusted-R2 0.088  
Obs        11817  
 
OLS regression. Model also incorporates industry and city dummies.  
t statistics appear in brackets 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 8: OLS Models for CEO Incentive Contracts, 2003 
Dependent variable: Incentive contracts 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
 
CEO characteristics:             
CEO tenure 0.001  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.001  
           [0.60]  [0.72]  [0.51]  [0.56]  [0.28]  [0.32]  
Education: Less than graduate degree             
Has graduate degree 0.082 ** 0.074 * 0.056  0.046  0.123 ** 0.102 * 
           [2.34]  [2.08]  [1.54]  [1.24]  [2.23]  [1.79]  
Has postgraduate degree 0.153 *** 0.147 *** 0.149 *** 0.138 *** 0.313 *** 0.29 *** 
           [4.67]  [4.38]  [3.76]  [3.45]  [5.45]  [4.99]  
Production autonomy of CEO 0.004  0.004  0.003  0.004  -0.007  -0.005  
           [0.43]  [0.51]  [0.40]  [0.53]  [-0.48]  [-0.38]  
Investment autonomy of CEO -0.021 *** -0.022 *** -0.021 *** -0.022 *** -0.026 ** -0.028 ** 
           [-3.02]  [-3.11]  [-3.23]  [-3.39]  [-2.18]  [-2.26]  
Employment autonomy of CEO 0.01 * 0.012 * 0.002  0.004  0.018  0.022 * 
           [1.76]  [2.09]  [0.20]  [0.50]  [1.54]  [1.89]  
CEO appointed by government -0.045  -0.045  -0.09 *** -0.093 *** -0.156 *** -0.165 *** 
           [-1.45]  [-1.37]  [-4.25]  [-4.52]  [-3.65]  [-3.76]  
Firm characteristics:             
Majority ownership: Domestic ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  
   Foreign -0.179 *** -0.137 *** -0.113 * -0.098  -0.278 *** -0.245 *** 
           [-3.67]  [-3.22]  [-1.90]  [-1.65]  [-3.83]  [-3.29]  
   State   0.047  0.04  0.026  0.016  0.047  0.029  
           [1.33]  [1.19]  [0.72]  [0.46]  [0.80]  [0.50]  
   No majority ownership -0.167 ** -0.139  -0.118  -0.109  -0.312 * -0.296 * 
           [-2.13]  [-1.64]  [-1.03]  [-0.95]  [-1.98]  [-1.76]  
Size (Log of employees) 0.017 ** 0.016 ** 0.026 *** 0.022 ** 0.053 *** 0.045 *** 
           [2.73]  [2.33]  [3.48]  [2.59]  [4.32]  [3.50]  
Age (Log of years) -0.039 ** -0.049 *** -0.005  -0.014  -0.006  -0.026  
           [-2.47]  [-3.00]  [-0.30]  [-0.86]  [-0.26]  [-0.97]  
Continued 
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Table 8 continued 
Dependent variable: Incentive contracts 
[1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  
Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  
Corporate governance:             
Type of Board of Directors (BOD): None ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  
   BOD with CEO/Chair separation 0.093 *** 0.002  0.094 ** 0.012  0.175 *** 0.006  
           [3.26]  [0.07]  [2.35]  [0.29]  [2.92]  [0.10]  
   BOD with CEO/Chair duality 0.069 ** -0.035  0.12 *** 0.023  0.162 *** -0.034  
           [2.85]  [-1.55]  [4.37]  [0.78]  [4.74]  [-0.93]  
Senior executives have previously been fired 0.163 *** 0.161 *** 0.145 *** 0.145 *** 0.279 *** 0.277 *** 
           [5.97]  [5.54]  [5.78]  [5.54]  [7.00]  [6.58]  
Additional controls only available for 2003 data:             
CP status: not a CP member   ref.    ref.    ref.  
High rank in CP   0.019    0.045    0.089 ** 
             [0.86]    [1.70]    [2.23]  
CP Member    -0.014    -0.021    -0.02  
             [-0.64]    [-0.82]    [-0.45]  
CP status missing   0.005    -0.01    -0.07  
             [0.06]    [-0.07]    [-0.35]  
Continued 
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Table 8 continued 
Dependent variable: Incentive contracts 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  
Stock ownership: no stock ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  
CEO owns 1-49% of stock   0.043    0.04 *   0.07 ** 
             [1.65]    [1.75]    [2.28]  
CEO owns 50%+ of stock   -0.004    0.008    0.005  
             [-0.11]    [0.19]    [0.08]  
Don't know how much stock CEO owns   0.136 *   0.2 ***   0.357 ** 
             [1.96]    [3.38]    [2.54]  
Promotion from within   0.04 **   0.026    0.065  
             [2.42]    [1.00]    [1.44]  
Independent member(s) on Board   0.067 ***   0.064 **   0.152 *** 
   [4.07]    [2.85]    [3.37]  
Employee rep on Board   0.127 ***   0.108 ***   0.211 *** 
             [5.70]    [4.59]    [4.82]  
CEO experience before current post   -0.003 *   -0.004    -0.001  
             [-1.82]    [-1.08]    [-0.31]  
Chinese      0.019    -0.057    -0.109  
             [0.45]    [-1.19]    [-1.17]  
Constant   0.17 ** 0.156 * 0.253 *** 0.321 *** 0.216 * 0.335 ** 
           [2.45] 
 
[1.85] 
 
[3.32] 
 
[3.93] 
 
[1.83] 
 
[2.27] 
 
Adjusted-R2 0.109 
 
0.124 
 
0.089 
 
0.101 
 
0.109 
 
0.128 
 
Obs        2203 
 
2203 
 
2203 
 
2203 
 
2203 
 
2203 
 
 
OLS regressions. All models incorporate industry and city dummies. 
Model 1, 2: Dependent variable is “paid via a contract linking pay to performance.” 
Model 3, 4: Dependent variable is “Whether or not three types of incentive contracts (incentive plan linking income to firm performance, annual pay contract (Nian Xin Zhi) 
or performance bond) identified.” 
Model 5, 6: Dependent variable is “the count of the three types of incentive contract.” 
t statistics in brackets 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Data Appendix 
 
We use data from two World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org). Our 
primary data source is the 2005 World Bank Investment Climate Survey undertaken by the 
National Bureau of Statistics in China.  It covers 12,400 firms located in 120 cities 
throughout China. One hundred firms are surveyed in each city except in the four largest 
cities (Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing and Chongqing) where 200 were surveyed. All provincial 
capitals are sampled together with cities selected based on the economic size of the province. 
Firms were randomly selected within the ten largest industries in each province (by value 
added). Consequently, the survey covers all major cities and is broadly representative of 
China as a whole. 
We also use the World Bank Enterprise Survey from 2003. This comprises a sample of 
2,400 enterprises from 18 cities: 150 from each of 12 larger cities and 100 from each of 6 
smaller cities. Of the cities surveyed, four are in the northeast (Benxi, Changchun, Dalian and 
Harbin), four along the coast (Hangzhou, Jiangmen, Shenzhen and Wenzhou), four in the 
central region (Changsha, Nanchang, Wuhan and Zhengzhou), and six in the western region 
(Chongqing, Guilin, Kunming, Nanning, Lanzhou and Xi’an). Both surveys are completed by 
the most senior manager at the firm. The rationale for using both surveys is two-fold. First, 
although smaller than the 2005 survey, the 2003 survey contains information on aspects of 
executive compensation and corporate governance which are absent from the 2005 data. 
Second, the sample frames are different for the two surveys. For example, the 2003 survey 
consists of smaller firms, and they are not drawn from the same locations as the 2005 survey.  
Thus running similar multivariate analyses on both samples provides an opportunity to 
establish the external validity of findings based on the 2005 survey.  Simple descriptive 
statistics from the two surveys are presented below. 
In both surveys the term "General Manager" is used to identify the CEO, but throughout 
the paper we refer to this executive as the CEO. 
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Appendix Table A1: Descriptive statistics, 2005 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
       
Whether CEO Pay linking to Firm Performance 11817 0.669  0.470  0 1 
 
       
Corporate governance:       
Type of Board of Directors (BOD): No BOD 11817 0.279  0.449  0 1 
 
   BOD with CEO/Chair separation 11817 0.357  0.479  0 1 
 
   BOD with CEO/Chair duality 11817 0.364  0.481  0 1 
 
Fire or demotion of CEO, last 4 years 11817 0.222  0.416  0 1 
 
 
CEO characteristics: 
      
CEO tenure (years) 11817 6.399  4.721  1 56 
 
Education of CEO 11817 5.575  0.994  1 7 
 
CEO appointed by government 11817 0.119  0.324  0 1 
 
Production autonomy of CEO 11817 7.410  1.490  1 8            
Investment autonomy of CEO 11817 6.868  2.054  1 8 
 
Employment autonomy of CEO 11817 7.305  1.587  1 8            
 
Firm characteristics: 
      
Majority ownership: State 11817 0.131  0.337  0 1 
 
   Collective 11817 0.082  0.275  0 1            
   Legal persons 11817 0.259  0.438  0 1 
 
   Private 11817 0.367  0.482  0 1            
   Foreign 11817 0.130  0.337  0 1 
 
   No majority ownership 11817 0.031  0.174  0 1            
Size (Log of employees) 11817 5.619  1.473  1.8  13.5  
 
Age (Log of years) 11817 2.277  0.786  1.1  4.9             
Coefficient of variance in sales, last 3 years 11817 0.324  0.251  0 1.7  
 
Number of power outages annually (divide by 100) 11817 0.114  0.239  0 4            
Industry: Petroleum 11817 0.014  0.119  0 1 
 
   AgProcess 11817 0.079  0.269  0 1            
   BlackMetal 11817 0.040  0.196  0 1 
 
   ChemFiber 11817 0.004  0.063  0 1            
   ChemMat 11817 0.116  0.321  0 1 
 
   ClothShoeHat 11817 0.017  0.127  0 1            
   ColorMetal 11817 0.028  0.164  0 1 
 
   CommunicateEquip 11817 0.046  0.210  0 1            
   Craft   11817 0.009  0.093  0 1 
 
   DrinkManufacture 11817 0.014  0.117  0 1            
   EduSportGood 11817 0.003  0.057  0 1 
 
   Electronics 11817 0.069  0.254  0 1            
Continued 
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Appendix Table A1 continued 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
       
   FoodManufacture 11817 0.020  0.140  0 1 
 
   Furniture 11817 0.004  0.067  0 1            
   GeneralEquip 11817 0.087  0.282  0 1 
 
   Instruments 11817 0.005  0.069  0 1            
   Leather 11817 0.012  0.107  0 1 
 
   Medical Equip 11817 0.034  0.182  0 1            
   Metal   11817 0.030  0.170  0 1 
 
   NonMetal 11817 0.105  0.306  0 1            
   Paper   11817 0.019  0.137  0 1 
 
   Plastic 11817 0.027  0.163  0 1            
   Printing 11817 0.005  0.069  0 1 
 
   Recycle 11817 0.000  0.016  0 1            
   Rubber  11817 0.002  0.040  0 1 
 
   SpecificEquip 11817 0.040  0.196  0 1            
   Textile 11817 0.077  0.267  0 1 
 
   Tobacco 11817 0.003  0.059  0 1            
   TransEquip 11817 0.079  0.270  0 1 
 
   WoodProcessing 11817 0.011  0.105  0 1            
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Appendix Table A2: Descriptive statistics, 2003 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Paid via a contract linking pay to performance 2203 0.286  0.452  0 1 
Any of the three types identified 2203 0.429  0.495  0 1 
The count of the three types of incentive contract 2203 0.606  0.796  0 3 
      
Corporate governance:      
Type of Board of Directors (BOD): No BOD 2203 0.489  0.500  0 1 
   BOD with CEO/Chair separation 2203 0.268  0.443  0 1 
   BOD with CEO/Chair duality 2203 0.243  0.429  0 1 
Fire experience of senior executives 2203 0.176  0.381  0 1 
CEO appointed by government 2203 0.124  0.330  0 1 
 
CEO characteristics:  
     
CEO tenure (years) 2203 5.730  4.223  1 33 
Has graduate degree 2203 0.680  0.466  0 1 
Has postgraduate degree 2203 0.155  0.362  0 1 
Production autonomy of CEO 2203 7.082  1.699  1 8 
Investment autonomy of CEO 2203 5.694  2.624  1 8 
Employment autonomy of CEO 2203 6.568  2.135  1 8 
 
Firm characteristics: 
     
Majority ownership: Domestic 2203 0.698  0.459  0 1 
   Foreign 2203 0.070  0.255  0 1 
   State   2203 0.218  0.413  0 1 
   No majority ownership 2203 0.014  0.118  0 1 
Industry: Clothing 2203 0.147  0.354  
  
   Food    2203 0.029  0.168  0 1 
   Metals and machinery 2203 0.064  0.245  0 1 
   Electronics 2203 0.225  0.417  0 1 
   Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 2203 0.036  0.187  0 1 
   IT services 2203 0.084  0.277  0 1 
   Telecommunications 2203 0.003  0.052  0 1 
   Accounting and finance 2203 0.069  0.253  0 1 
   Advertising and marketing 2203 0.064  0.244  0 1 
   Other services 2203 0.112  0.316  0 1 
   Auto and auto components 2203 0.168  0.374  0 1 
Size (Log of employees) 2203 4.869  1.495  0.0  11.2  
Age (Log of years) 2203 2.297  0.885  0.7  4.0  
Continued 
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Appendix Table A1 continued 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Additional controls only available in 2003      
CP status: Not member 2203 0.326  0.469  0 1 
High rank in CP 2203 0.420  0.494  0 1 
CP Member  2203 0.241  0.428  0 1 
CP status missing 2203 0.013  0.112  0 1 
Stock ownership: No stock 2203 0.695  0.461  0 1 
CEO owns 1-49% of stock 2203 0.181  0.385  0 1 
CEO owns 50%+ of stock 2203 0.102  0.302  0 1 
Don't know how much stock CEO owns 2203 0.022  0.148  0 1 
Promotion from within 2203 0.356  0.479  0 1 
Independent member(s) on Board 2203 0.166  0.372  0 1 
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Chinese    2203 0.959  0.199  0 1 
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